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void because the "School of Medicine, University of Texas," is not a
legal entity capable of taking a gift.
Appeal: Judgment affirmed.
Reasons: A foreign will if valid in a foreign jurisdiction is
valid in Colorado and may be admitted to probate. The filing of a
caveat although permissible does not effect the validity of a foreign
will.
Section 39, Chapter 176, '35 CSA provides that a will must
be in writing, signed and acknowledged by the testator in the presence of two witnesses and declared by him to be his last will and
testament. Section 62A as amended in 1947 provides, "As used in
this section the words 'foreign will' means an instrument in writing which has been or shall be admitted to probate as the last will
and testament or codicil of a decedent before any court or tribunal
other than a court of this state, such court or tribunal being
authorized by the laws of such jurisdiction to admit the same to
probate, whether or not such instrument was executed in accordance with Section 39 of this Chapter."
It is further provided in this opinion that the devise to the
sister was not ambiguous and, therefore, valid.
It is also further provided that the devise to the Texas School
of Medicine was valid as shown by these citations. The School of
Medicine was a part of the University of Texas and as such a legal
entity.

ATTORNEYS, COURTS, EQUITY
By FLOYD K. MURR, of the Walsenburg Bar
ATTORNEYS

Under the classification of attorneys two cases were decided
by the Supreme Court during the past year. In People v. Logan,1
the Supreme Court disbarred an attorney who wrongfully spent
for his own purpose money received by him from his client for the
purchase of property. The attorney had also retained money collected by him for clients, refusing to make settlement until after
complaint was made to the Grievance Committee of the Bar Association. The referee had recommended suspension but the Court felt
compelled to go beyond because of the gravity of the charges.
In People v. Woodall,2 a layman was fined $200 by the Supreme
Court for drafting and causing to be executed a will. The only
phase of the case presenting a new element was the defense of
respondent, a bank cashier, who alleged he did it because the town's
only resident attorney was always away. The Court apparently
was not impressed with this unusual defense.
11953-54 C. B. A. Adv. Sh. No. 17.
2 1953-54, C. B. A. Adv. Sh. No. 7.
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In another case to be reported under another topic, 3 the
Supreme Court stated that Sec. 9, Ch. 177, '35 CSA, which prohibits an attorney from being examined as to any communication
made by a client to him, except with permission of the client, does
not apply when the attorney's ethics and professional conduct are
questioned.
COURTS

With some exceptions, the cases assigned for review under the
heading of "Courts" are more noteworthy for their applicability to
other branches of the law.
Two cases dealt with the jurisdiction of County Courts in lunacy matters. In Rickey v. People,4 the complaint in lunacy was
filed in the wrong county, the alleged lunatic being a resident of
another county. In Iwerks v. People,5 the complaint was filed in
the right county, but the process was served by the sheriff in
the wrong county. The sheriff of Adams County went into Denver
County and attempted to serve notice on the alleged incompetent,
where of course he had no authority to act. In both cases, the
Supreme Court held that the County Court was without jurisdiction in the matter. In the latter case, the Attorney General, in confessing error stated that "the facade of the building is regular in
all respects, but its foundation appears to be builded upon the sands
of expediency and not on the rock of legal authority".
A gift taxpayer found himself in a dilemma in the complicated
case of People v. Maytag,6 but only a thumb nail sketch will be
attempted here. The inheritance tax commissioner, who administers the gift tax law, 7 failed to determine the tax and give notice
thereof within the time then required by sections 10 and 11 of the
Act. This was held not to affect the duty of the commissioner to
compute and collect the gift tax due the state in a previous decision by the Supreme Court involving the same parties." The taxpayer was told by the Supreme Court in that case that if he were
dissatisfied with the deermination of tax, he should proceed under
that part of the Act which in substance provides for a remedy by
petition to a Court by an aggrieved taxpayer on the grounds of
"erroneous valuatiQn, appraisement, or assessment or otherwise". 9
This action was then filed by taxpayer expressly under the Act
asking the Court again to prohibit the commissioner from computing the tax for his failure to determine the tax within the time and
give notice as required by the Act. The Supreme Court held that
these questions were decided in the original action and that res
judicata precluded their consideration. The Court then held that
3Browning

v. Potter, 271 P. 2d 418, 1953-54 C. B. A. Adv. Sh. No. 15.
P. 2d 1021, 1953-54 C. B. A. Adv. Sh. No. 10.
'273 P. 2d 133, 1953-54 C. B. A. Adv. Sh. No. 17.
'270 P. 2d 782, 1953-54 C. B. A. Adv. Sh. No. 13.
7COLO. STAT. ANN., C. 25A (1935).
'1953-54 C. B. A. Adv. Sh. No. 13, p. 289.
4267

'CoLo.

STAT. ANN.. C. 75A, §15 (1935).
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the statutory remedy which provides for review of the tax on
grounds of erroneous "valuation, appraisement or assessment, or
otherwise", gives a court a limited jurisdiction to review only the
appraisement, assessment or valuation concerning a gift tax. The
word "otherwise" was held to qualify the words "valuation, appraisement or assessment". The court incidentally remarked that
neither the attorney general nor the commissioner has any authority to compromise a gift tax.
In the case of Oliver v. Harper,10 the Supreme Court was
asked to determine the disposition of $19 which had been paid into
the registry of Court by the sureties on a bond under the mistaken
impression that they were to pay the costs in addition to the judgment for the maximum liability on their bond. The Supreme Court
held that the overpayment of a judgment by $19 could not be considered an appeal and that a statement of the trial court that the
$19 should be returned to the sureties did not amount to a valid
judgment and that further litigation would be required to dispose of the money.
In Calvin v. Fitzsimmons," a judgment of the trial court in a
boundary line dispute which determined that the boundary line
between the land of the plaintiff and the land of the defendant is
"that line along which a fence was constructed by the plaintiff
between said lands in the year 1940, as shown by the evidence and
testimony herein", was held to be invalid because of uncertainty
where the fence had been completely destroyed in 1949, and its
former location could be ascertained only from those familiar with
its location. The Supreme Court said:
. * assuming that there was evidence before the Court
which would enable it to definitely and specifically describe
the boundaries between these two quarter sections, nevertheless, it was not incorporated in the judgment and decree.
Browning v. Potter12 is a case in which both the executor and
the heirs of a decedent were validly served with summons in a suit
to adjudicate interests in certain mining claims under Rule 105,
R.C.P. Colorado. Neither the executor nor the heirs filed answers
or appeared in the suit within the time required by the rules of
procedure and default was entered against them. The heirs sought
to have the defaults vacated on the grounds of excusable neglect,
setting forth that the executor suffered a mental aberration which
prevented his taking action to protect their interests and alleging
also that an attorney failed to perform properly his professional
duty to them. The Supreme Court sustained the lower court in refusing to vacate the defaults pointing out that the executor, who
had suffered a stroke in 1949, was not incapacitated in 1952 when
10267 P. 2d 1114, 1953-54 C. B. A. Adv. Sh. No. 10.

" 270 P. 2d 748, 1953-54 C. B. A. Adv. Sh. No. 14.
" 271 P. 2d 420, 1953-54 C. B. A. Adv. Sh. No. 15.
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the action was commenced; that during the period involved he discussed matters intelligently, and furnished counsel with addresses
of non-resident defendants; that he was not confined to his room
and took his meals at restaurants and had discussed the case with
others. The Court dismissed the contention of the heirs that their
default was due to an attorney where the record showed that the
attorney advised the heirs orally and in writing that he did not
represent them in this case.
•.. the burden is upon a defendant to establish the grounds
on which he relies, by clear and convincing proof; the
granting or denial of an application to vacate a default,
based on excusable neglect, rests in the sound judicial discretion of the trial court...
The functions of judge and jury in a tort case are demonstrated
in Eberle v. Hungerford,13 in which plaintiff was a guest. The
Supreme Court held that plaintiff was no less a guest because she
had given the driver of the automobile $2.00 to "help on gas" and
the Court sustained the trial judge in directing a verdict in favor
of the driver where the evidence did not show more than ordinary
negligence on his part. But the trial judge was held to be in error
in directing a verdict in favor of the driver of the other automobile
where there was a dispute in the testimony as to which, if any,
driver went through a red light at the intersection where the collision occurred. This presented an issue of fact for the jury to decide, for if the driver of the other vehicle was negligent, plaintiff
could recover against him.
4
In Woodruff v. Clarke,1
a wife purchased a home with funds
given to her by her husband's mother and took title to the property
in her own name. In an action by a judgment creditor of the husband, whose judgment was obtained before the wife purchased the
property, the trial court determined that the husband had an interest in the home which the wife held as trustee, and referred the
matter to a referee to determine the amount of this interest. The
Supreme Court reversed the trial court and said that the husband
had no interest in the property which could be reached by his judgment creditor. The fact that the husband had paid some interest on
the indebtedness which was outstanding on the property did not
warrant the trial court's determination that he owned an interest
in the home.
Finally, in State Highway Department v. Swift, 5 a stipulation
in condemnation proceedings which required the highway department to construct access roads from the highway across certain
described parcels of land owned by landowner was construed by the
Supreme Court as not requiring the Highway Department to construct bridges to connect the access roads to the highway.
1953-54 C. B. A. Adv. Sh. No. 18.
262 P. 2d 738, 1953-54 C. B. A. Adv. Sh. No. 4.
18 270 P. 2d 750, 1953-54 C. B. A. Adv. Sh. No. 14.
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EQUITY
Among the cases assigned to be reported under the heading of
"Equity", two involved laches. Plaintiff was not barred by laches
in Prosser v. Schmidt 16 where during a period of approximately
four years the defendants had failed to execute and deliver a
deed and obtain releases of certain mortgages in accordance with
their written agreement to convey certain lands to plaintiff and the
evidence showed plaintiff was at all times ready and able to perform his part of the agreement. There was evidence that defendants were away much of the time and that plaintiff tried unsuccessfully to contact them. The Court held that "delay that might
be chargeable to plaintiff did not start to run against him until
there was full tender or performance on the part of defendants".
An interesting aspect of this case is the finding by the Supreme
Court that defendants' counsel in his brief on appeal had re-arranged the facts to create a favorable impression. The Court said:
"Voluntary enlargement of the facts shown by the testimony in an
attempt to augment defendants' defensive position does not enhance their standing before a Court of equity".
Laches did bar the remedy in McDermott v. Bent County, Colorado Irr. Dist.17 where petitioners sought to require an irrigation
district to pay for services rendered some 19 to 30 years prior to
filing suit. A bond issue had been approved by a decree of the
District Court in 1932 to pay the district's indebtedness, and apparently, the petitioners proposed at that time to accept bonds of
the district in lieu of cash in settlement of their claims against the
district. The bonds were never issued and the decree was not recorded in the office of the County Clerk until 2 months before this
action. In the meantime, more than 14,000 acres of land in the
district went to tax sale, tax deeds were issued, titles were quieted
and intervening purchases of the land were made by persons having no notice of petitioners' claims. In addition to denying petitioners' claims because of their laches, the Supreme Court seemed
to hold, re-stating a well settled doctrine, that the tax titles extinguished any prior liens and initiated new titles to the lands embraced within the district.
In Howard v. Beavers,18 a contract for the sale and exchange
of real estate was not sufficiently definite to authorize the remedy
of specific performance. The contract provided as follows: . . .
and said party of the first part will . .. convey back unto the party
of the second part a mortgage on the property hereinabove described ... for $14,800, being the balance due to the party of the
second part . . ." No other provisions relating to the mortgage
appeared in the contract. Because the time and terms of payment
of the mortgage were not set forth, the degree of certainty reIs262 P. 2d 272, 1953-54 C. B. A. Adv. Sh. No. 2.
" 272 P. 2d 995, 1953-54 C. B. A. Adv. Sh. No. 16.
264 P. 2d 858, 1953-54 C. B. A. Adv. Sh. No. 6.
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quired for specific performance was absent. The Court refused to
hold that the parties intended the execution of a demand mortgage.
The Court held however, that the contract was sufficiently certain
to sustain an action for damages for breach of contract.
The novel part of this case was that plaintiff, after suit was
begun, executed a deed to the real estate he was to exchange and
sent it by registered mail to the defendant. Because the defendant
received and retained the deed, plaintiff argued that defendant ratified the contract or in some way was put in constructive possession
of the real estate described in the deed. The Court summarily disposed of this contention saying there was no delivery or acceptance
of the deed and that the self serving act of the plaintiff did not
ripen into an estoppel as against defendant.
In another case, an octogenarian sold and conveyed his homestead on a day when by his own testimony he was as "healthy as
a ground hog"; but he did not feel well the next day and sometime
later brought an action to set aside his deed on grounds of fraud
and undue influence. This, in a nutshell, is the case of Bivens v.
Van Matre,19 in which the trial court was sustained in holding that
the evidence was not sufficiently clear and convincing to authorize
the setting aside of the deed. The facts also showed that the transaction was reviewed for plaintiff by an attorney selected by plaintiff before. the deed was executed and that the price paid plaintiff
for the land was comparable to prices received for other lands
recently sold in the vicinity.
Merth v. Hobart,20 involved an action for partition in which
the Supreme Court stated that there is no difference in a partition
suit as to property held by tenants in common and property held
by joint tenants. The case is a factual one in which the trial court
was sustained in its findings that plaintiff's $10,000 which was
used to purchase a home in her name and in the names of the defendants, husband and wife, as joint tenants, should be returned
to the plaintiff, there being no agreement obligating the parties in
any manner.
19

270 P. 2d 761, 1953-54 C. B. A. Adv. Sh. No. 14.
272 P. 2d 273, 1953-54 C. B. A. Adv. Sh. No. 16.

Your contribution to the Colorado Bar Foundation today
will still be promoting a better administration of justice in
Colorado for generations to come. The corpus of funds which
the Foundation acquires cannot be invaded. Name the Colorado Bar Foundation in your Will. Mail your contribution
today to the Colorado Bar Foundation, 702 Midland Savings
Building, Denver 2, Colorado.
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BOOK TRADERS CORNER
David McKee at AComa 2-2521 has the following books for
sale:
Corpus Juris Secondum, Vols. 1 to 84
American Law Reports, Annotated, Vols. 1-175
American Law Reports, Permanent Digest, Vols. 1-12
American Law Reports, Blue Book, Vols 1 and 2
American Law Reports, Digest Index, 1 Vol.
American Law Reports, Second Series, Vols. 1-36
American Law Reports, Second Series, (Digest, Vols. 1-25, 1 Vol.)
American Law Reports, Blue Book, Second Series, 1 Vol.
American Law Reports, Second Series, Red Desk Service, 1 Vol.
Federal Reporter, Second Series, Vols. 123-211
McQuillin Municipal Corporation, Vols. 1-7
McQuillin Municipal Corporation, Supplemental 1930 & 1932
U. S. Code Annotated, complete including index of four volumes,
tables-2 vols.; constitution-4 vols.
U. S. Code, Congressional and Administrative News, 1948 through
1953.
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